Centre Meïr d'Etudes Juives (CMEJ) - Jérusalem, Juillet 2007
Wednesday, July 25, 2007
The 'Jordanian option,' the plan that refuses to die
By Reuven Pedatzur (Ha'aretz)
From time to time it rears its head anew, indicating that perhaps a solution to the Palestinian problem is possible only within the Jordanian context. Over the past few weeks, for example, people close to Jordanian monarch King Abdullah have been traveling around the world floating a trial balloon, testing the reactions of world leaders and Palestinians to the idea of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation.
Recently, Abdelsalaam Majali, who was and who may be again the Jordanian prime minister, paid a visit to Israel. In talks with Israeli politicians, Majali spoke of the confederation plan as if it were his own initiative, but one could discern that he had received the blessings of King Abdullah before coming to Israel.
Majali has been trying to win over support for the plan in the United States as well. In a few weeks, a seminar will be held at the Hudson Institute in Washington with the participation of Jordanians and Palestinians, who will discuss the future ties between the Hashemite kingdom and a Palestinian state that will be established in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Officials in the Palestine Authority will not comment publicly on the ideas raised by Majali, but quite a few senior members of the Fatah leadership are starting to believe that the plan could perhaps be a way out of the dead-end where they have been trapped since the Oslo agreements. There are people close to Abu Mazen who do not reject the idea out of hand, and who feel it is worth studying further - but clandestinely, and without making public the contacts that are being held with Jordan.
The reason for the resurrection of the confederation plan between Jordan and the Palestinians lies in the fear of the decision-makers in Amman: that the struggle between Fatah and Hamas will spill over into Jordanian territory. The civil war in the Gaza Strip lit a warning light in Jordan. The Jordanians are afraid of a stream of Palestinian refugees from the West Bank crossing over the Jordan River. Even today, more than 60 percent of the residents of Jordan define themselves as Palestinians. One of the possible solutions therefore is to create a joint political framework in which Jordan will still have precedence, but a large measure of autonomy will be reserved for the Palestinians to administer their own affairs.
Abdullah has not forgotten the attempt by Yasser Arafat in September 1970 to depose his father, King Hussein. The confederation idea, if it is accepted by the Palestinians, is intended to prevent similar attempts in the future and to ensure the future of the Hashemite kingdom.
According to the plans of the king's assistants, the Hashemite monarch - as the direct descendant of the prophet Mohammed - will serve as the president of the confederation, in addition to his position as the monarch of the Jordanian kingdom; and a federal government will be set up together with an elected parliament that will be composed of both Jordanian and Palestinian representatives.
The security forces will come under the control of the federal government, and this will supposedly allay the fears of Israel about the activities of independent Palestinian military forces. The condition for the establishment of the federation, Abdullah's aides say, is an Israeli-Palestinian agreement over the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Only after that will the independent state be invited to join the proposed confederation.
No one in Israel is commenting publicly on the Jordanian idea, but it is clear that the decision-makers are listening intently to the voices coming from Amman. Shimon Peres stated in his testimony to the Winograd committee that "we have to seek a new structure with the Palestinians. In my heart, I have returned to the conclusion that I always held in life: we must bring in the Jordanians. We cannot make peace only with the Palestinians."
In effect, the diplomatic pendulum in Jerusalem has been swaying back and forth since the Six Day War between the "Palestinian option" and the "Jordanian option."
The Alignment-led governments under Levi Eshkol (1967-1969), Golda Meir (1969-1974) and Yitzhak Rabin (1974-1977) adopted the Jordanian option, under which the solution to the Palestinian problem was to transfer control for most of the territory of the West Bank to the Jordanian monarch. The option was formulated about a year after the end of the Six Day War, and only after the attempts to implement the Palestinian option had failed.
In cabinet meetings after the end of the Six Day War, the proposals from the majority of ministers fluctuated between Palestinian autonomy and an independent state in the West Bank, with those who set the tone - prime minister Eshkol, defense minister Moshe Dayan, labor minister Yigal Allon and information minister Yisrael Galili - all in favor of the Palestinian option. At the cabinet meeting on June 19, 1967, Allon warned against the Jordanian option: "Gentlemen, we entertained thoughts of this in 1948 with everything relating to the Hashemite household, and instead of conquering Jerusalem - something we could have done - and the entire West Bank, a matter of three to four days, we entertained thoughts of the Hashemite monarchy, and we paid for this dearly. I am afraid that this is happening once again. The last thing we must do is to return one inch of the West Bank. We must not view Hussein as existing forever - today it is Hussein, but tomorrow it is Nabulsi, and the day after that some Syrian will take hold of them and following that they will make a defense pact with the Soviet Union and China and we'll find ourselves in a much more difficult position. We are talking about a matter that is not forever, and we are placing it on a phenomenon that is flesh and blood, and perhaps will remain for a maximum of 60 years, if he does not get shot before that."
Allon claimed that the only logical solution that could be an answer to Israel's security needs in the eastern sector was the establishment of a Palestinian state. "I am taking the maximum possibility. Not a canton, not an autonomous region, but an independent Arab state agreed on between us and them in an enclave surrounded by Israeli territory - independent even in its foreign policy."
Eshkol and Dayan also expressed opposition to negotiations with King Hussein, and supported investigating the possibility of implementing an arrangement that would be based on the Palestinian option. At a discussion held by the diplomatic committee of the Alignment party on July 7, 1967, Eshkol made his position clear on the subject of the future of the West Bank. According to his conception, there was no choice in order to ensure Israel's security needs but to continue to control the entire area as far as the Jordan River militarily.
But in order to avoid turning Israel into a bi-national state, the Arab citizens of the West bank must be granted a special status. "I see only a quasi-independent region because the security and the land are in Israeli hands," Eshkol said. "I don't care if they eventually want representation in the United Nations. I started with an autonomous region, but if it turns out that this is impossible, they will get independence."
Galili attacked the Jordanian monarch fiercely during the cabinet meeting of October 17, 1967: "I agree that people have a great deal of pity for the fledgling king who deserves compassion, but it is worth stressing in every way possible that Hussein never expressed an opinion in favor of peace with Israel. (He) participated in the founding gathering of Shukeiry's organization. He shelled Jerusalem. His attitude toward the holy places is well known - it must be stressed who the partner is that the various peace-seekers are nurturing as the ally for negotiations about peace."
In an attempt to implement the Palestinian option, and after it became clear to him that his senior ministers rejected the Jordanian option, Eshkol took a series of steps to examine the possibility of reaching a diplomatic solution. In a discussion held on November 12, 1967, he raised the need for holding diplomatic contacts with the Arabs of the territories. "We must examine the possibilities of setting up a movement for an independent state in the West Bank, to examine which of the leaders it is worth our while meeting, which minister will meet with whom, and perhaps also the prime minister himself."
At the beginning of February 1968, Eshkol decided to hold a series of clandestine talks with leaders from the territories. These talks went on until September. He tried to clarify with his interlocutors the possibility of leading the process in the direction of setting up an autonomy in the West Bank. However, when Eshkol mentioned in a conversation with Hikmet al-Masri and Walid Shak'a from Nablus the idea of bringing about an agreement between Israel and the residents of the West Bank, al-Masri told him the problem would have to be solved with the entire Arab world. "If you claim that you can't act as Palestinians, then we have reached deadlock," Eshkol responded.
During the first few months of 1968, Eshkol vacillated between the desire to give momentum to the idea of Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank, and the recognition that it was necessary to speak with the Jordanian king. By the end of that September, Eshkol had approved no fewer than six meetings with Hussein, including those with the participation of foreign minister Abba Eban and labor minister Allon.
Parallel to this, the American administration made it clear to Israel that it was possible to reach an agreement only through Hussein. Hussein is prepared to conduct negotiations, Lyndon Johnson wrote in a letter to Eshkol at the beginning of April 1968, but his position is shaky. Israel has to take into account his plight and show flexibility for his position, the U.S. president said.
One of the developments that apparently had the most influence on the decision to abandon the Palestinian option was a change in Allon's position. When he placed the original "Allon plan" on the cabinet's table on July 27, 1967, he had proposed that a Palestinian autonomy be set up in the West Bank. A vast majority of the ministers rejected the plan when it was brought before the plenary session of the government on July 30. However, the attitude toward the plan gradually began changing, to a large extent also because no alternative plans were submitted.
At the beginning of 1968, Allon began formulating another concept. He decided to abandon the Palestinian option and adopt instead what would later be known as the "Jordanian option." The idea raised by Allon was simple: Instead of wrestling with the complex issue of implementing autonomy, the territory would be handed over to Jordan, and in this way Israel would be freed of the need to deal with the Palestinian problem. Allon did not make changes to the map he had sketched in July 1967 (except for adding a passage to join Jordan to the West bank in the area of Jericho), proposing that the Jordan Valley remain in Israeli hands, and that the same should be true for Gush Etzion, part of the Hebron foothills and united Jerusalem. All the remainder would be handed over to King Hussein.
An important discussion about this issue took place at a meeting of the Alignment's diplomatic committee on April 20, 1968. On the agenda was the anticipated meeting of Abba Eban with King Hussein. All those who spoke supported holding the meeting, and most of them - with the exception of Dayan and Shimon Peres who was the secretary of the Rafi party at the time - expressed backing for the "Allon plan" as the basis of the policy.
Toward the end of September 1968, the decisive meeting with Hussein was held. This meeting, which took place in London, was attended both by Eban and Allon. King Hussein was accompanied by his close adviser, Ziad Rifai. Eban outlined for the king the six principles that summed up Israel's approach to a diplomatic agreement with Jordan, which included the demilitarization of the West Bank, the deployment of Israeli troops in the Jordan Valley, a united Jerusalem under Israeli control, and the establishment of a joint authority for the refugees. Allon also showed him the map from his plan, and told Hussein that "these are not temporary corrections that will be valid so long as you are king and as long as I and Abba Eban are alive, but arrangements that will be valid for generations to come - you lost the war and you must face the consequence."
"My problem," Hussein replied, "is how to explain the solution to my nation if it is not a solution that will be acceptable to the Arab awareness."
A few days later, Rifai presented a document with Hussein's six principles, as a response to the six principles outlined by Eban. Hussein wrote inter alia that the Jordanians accept the principles of UN Resolution 242, including the statement that territories cannot be acquired by force. He said that they were aware that changes would have to be made in the cease-fire lines, but that these changes would have to be done on the basis of mutuality. Turning to the question of Jerusalem, he said that the most the Jordanians would be able to agree to would be the recognition of Israel's rights over the places holy to Judaism. The Jordanian document ends by saying that their ability to contribute to the arrangement is totally dependent on their ability to control the internal situation in Jordan, and to explain the agreement to the Arab world. Therefore, the Jordanian document added, any proposal that was discussed would have to be such as the Arab world was prepared to accept, and not something that was forced upon them.
This meeting made it clear to the decision-makers in Israel that the Jordanian option was not feasible. They understood that Hussein did not want to be, and most likely also could not be, the first Arab leader that signed a peace agreement with Israel. Nevertheless, not much time had elapsed until Israel's commitment toward Hussein's regime was put to the test. In September 1970, that "Black September" when Yasser Arafat went to war against Hussein's regime, it was Israel that came to the aid of the king and, in fact, saved his throne.
On March 15, 1972, in an attempt to prevent what seemed to him to be the next step of the Israeli government - the annexation of the West Bank - Hussein proposed that the two sides of the Jordan become united in what would be the "Joint Arab Kingdom" which, of course, he would head. The Palestine Liberation Organization turned down his offer without hesitation. In June 1977, Hussein once again raised the idea of a federation; this time it was to be composed of the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan and an autonomy in the West Bank. This proposal, too, was swiftly rejected by Arafat.
In 1987, Peres, who was then foreign minister, attempted to revive the Jordanian option. After secret talks with Hussein at the London home of their mutual friend, Lord Victor Mishkin, the "London agreement" was drawn up but it was torpedoed by then-prime minister Yitzhak Shamir. Its principles were to a large extent similar to those that had been presented to the king in September 1968. Incidentally, Rifai was also present at this meeting, this time in his capacity as Hussein's prime minister. Then in December 1987 the first intifada broke out, and one of its consequences was Hussein's decision in July 1988 to cut off ties with the West Bank.
The first circle of the Jordanian option, which began in June 1967, was completed on September 13, 1993, with the singing of the Oslo agreements. The government headed by Yitzhak Rabin, who had been the chief of staff in 1967, brought back the Israeli policy with regard to the Palestinian problem to its starting point of June 1967, and to the Palestinian option. In Rabin's decision to recognize the legitimacy of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people, and to sign an agreement with it, came a clear strategic decision between the two basic orientations that had accompanied Israeli policy in the 25 years that preceded the Oslo Accords.
The peace treaty between Israel and Jordan was signed in October 1994. King Hussein, who three decades earlier had been wary of being the first Arab leader to make peace with Israel, followed in the footsteps of Anwar Saadat. On the face of it, the process had been completed and the die had been cast in favor of the Palestinian option, but the second intifada cut short this process, and once again the Jordanian option was pushed into the vacuum that had been created in the peace process beginning in September 2000. The second circle of the Jordanian option had been opened up once again.
From time to time it rears its head anew, indicating that perhaps a solution to the Palestinian problem is possible only within the Jordanian context. Over the past few weeks, for example, people close to Jordanian monarch King Abdullah have been traveling around the world floating a trial balloon, testing the reactions of world leaders and Palestinians to the idea of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation.
Recently, Abdelsalaam Majali, who was and who may be again the Jordanian prime minister, paid a visit to Israel. In talks with Israeli politicians, Majali spoke of the confederation plan as if it were his own initiative, but one could discern that he had received the blessings of King Abdullah before coming to Israel.
Majali has been trying to win over support for the plan in the United States as well. In a few weeks, a seminar will be held at the Hudson Institute in Washington with the participation of Jordanians and Palestinians, who will discuss the future ties between the Hashemite kingdom and a Palestinian state that will be established in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Officials in the Palestine Authority will not comment publicly on the ideas raised by Majali, but quite a few senior members of the Fatah leadership are starting to believe that the plan could perhaps be a way out of the dead-end where they have been trapped since the Oslo agreements. There are people close to Abu Mazen who do not reject the idea out of hand, and who feel it is worth studying further - but clandestinely, and without making public the contacts that are being held with Jordan.
The reason for the resurrection of the confederation plan between Jordan and the Palestinians lies in the fear of the decision-makers in Amman: that the struggle between Fatah and Hamas will spill over into Jordanian territory. The civil war in the Gaza Strip lit a warning light in Jordan. The Jordanians are afraid of a stream of Palestinian refugees from the West Bank crossing over the Jordan River. Even today, more than 60 percent of the residents of Jordan define themselves as Palestinians. One of the possible solutions therefore is to create a joint political framework in which Jordan will still have precedence, but a large measure of autonomy will be reserved for the Palestinians to administer their own affairs.
Abdullah has not forgotten the attempt by Yasser Arafat in September 1970 to depose his father, King Hussein. The confederation idea, if it is accepted by the Palestinians, is intended to prevent similar attempts in the future and to ensure the future of the Hashemite kingdom.
According to the plans of the king's assistants, the Hashemite monarch - as the direct descendant of the prophet Mohammed - will serve as the president of the confederation, in addition to his position as the monarch of the Jordanian kingdom; and a federal government will be set up together with an elected parliament that will be composed of both Jordanian and Palestinian representatives.
The security forces will come under the control of the federal government, and this will supposedly allay the fears of Israel about the activities of independent Palestinian military forces. The condition for the establishment of the federation, Abdullah's aides say, is an Israeli-Palestinian agreement over the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Only after that will the independent state be invited to join the proposed confederation.
No one in Israel is commenting publicly on the Jordanian idea, but it is clear that the decision-makers are listening intently to the voices coming from Amman. Shimon Peres stated in his testimony to the Winograd committee that "we have to seek a new structure with the Palestinians. In my heart, I have returned to the conclusion that I always held in life: we must bring in the Jordanians. We cannot make peace only with the Palestinians."
In effect, the diplomatic pendulum in Jerusalem has been swaying back and forth since the Six Day War between the "Palestinian option" and the "Jordanian option."
The Alignment-led governments under Levi Eshkol (1967-1969), Golda Meir (1969-1974) and Yitzhak Rabin (1974-1977) adopted the Jordanian option, under which the solution to the Palestinian problem was to transfer control for most of the territory of the West Bank to the Jordanian monarch. The option was formulated about a year after the end of the Six Day War, and only after the attempts to implement the Palestinian option had failed.
In cabinet meetings after the end of the Six Day War, the proposals from the majority of ministers fluctuated between Palestinian autonomy and an independent state in the West Bank, with those who set the tone - prime minister Eshkol, defense minister Moshe Dayan, labor minister Yigal Allon and information minister Yisrael Galili - all in favor of the Palestinian option. At the cabinet meeting on June 19, 1967, Allon warned against the Jordanian option: "Gentlemen, we entertained thoughts of this in 1948 with everything relating to the Hashemite household, and instead of conquering Jerusalem - something we could have done - and the entire West Bank, a matter of three to four days, we entertained thoughts of the Hashemite monarchy, and we paid for this dearly. I am afraid that this is happening once again. The last thing we must do is to return one inch of the West Bank. We must not view Hussein as existing forever - today it is Hussein, but tomorrow it is Nabulsi, and the day after that some Syrian will take hold of them and following that they will make a defense pact with the Soviet Union and China and we'll find ourselves in a much more difficult position. We are talking about a matter that is not forever, and we are placing it on a phenomenon that is flesh and blood, and perhaps will remain for a maximum of 60 years, if he does not get shot before that."
Allon claimed that the only logical solution that could be an answer to Israel's security needs in the eastern sector was the establishment of a Palestinian state. "I am taking the maximum possibility. Not a canton, not an autonomous region, but an independent Arab state agreed on between us and them in an enclave surrounded by Israeli territory - independent even in its foreign policy."
Eshkol and Dayan also expressed opposition to negotiations with King Hussein, and supported investigating the possibility of implementing an arrangement that would be based on the Palestinian option. At a discussion held by the diplomatic committee of the Alignment party on July 7, 1967, Eshkol made his position clear on the subject of the future of the West Bank. According to his conception, there was no choice in order to ensure Israel's security needs but to continue to control the entire area as far as the Jordan River militarily.
But in order to avoid turning Israel into a bi-national state, the Arab citizens of the West bank must be granted a special status. "I see only a quasi-independent region because the security and the land are in Israeli hands," Eshkol said. "I don't care if they eventually want representation in the United Nations. I started with an autonomous region, but if it turns out that this is impossible, they will get independence."
Galili attacked the Jordanian monarch fiercely during the cabinet meeting of October 17, 1967: "I agree that people have a great deal of pity for the fledgling king who deserves compassion, but it is worth stressing in every way possible that Hussein never expressed an opinion in favor of peace with Israel. (He) participated in the founding gathering of Shukeiry's organization. He shelled Jerusalem. His attitude toward the holy places is well known - it must be stressed who the partner is that the various peace-seekers are nurturing as the ally for negotiations about peace."
In an attempt to implement the Palestinian option, and after it became clear to him that his senior ministers rejected the Jordanian option, Eshkol took a series of steps to examine the possibility of reaching a diplomatic solution. In a discussion held on November 12, 1967, he raised the need for holding diplomatic contacts with the Arabs of the territories. "We must examine the possibilities of setting up a movement for an independent state in the West Bank, to examine which of the leaders it is worth our while meeting, which minister will meet with whom, and perhaps also the prime minister himself."
At the beginning of February 1968, Eshkol decided to hold a series of clandestine talks with leaders from the territories. These talks went on until September. He tried to clarify with his interlocutors the possibility of leading the process in the direction of setting up an autonomy in the West Bank. However, when Eshkol mentioned in a conversation with Hikmet al-Masri and Walid Shak'a from Nablus the idea of bringing about an agreement between Israel and the residents of the West Bank, al-Masri told him the problem would have to be solved with the entire Arab world. "If you claim that you can't act as Palestinians, then we have reached deadlock," Eshkol responded.
During the first few months of 1968, Eshkol vacillated between the desire to give momentum to the idea of Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank, and the recognition that it was necessary to speak with the Jordanian king. By the end of that September, Eshkol had approved no fewer than six meetings with Hussein, including those with the participation of foreign minister Abba Eban and labor minister Allon.
Parallel to this, the American administration made it clear to Israel that it was possible to reach an agreement only through Hussein. Hussein is prepared to conduct negotiations, Lyndon Johnson wrote in a letter to Eshkol at the beginning of April 1968, but his position is shaky. Israel has to take into account his plight and show flexibility for his position, the U.S. president said.
One of the developments that apparently had the most influence on the decision to abandon the Palestinian option was a change in Allon's position. When he placed the original "Allon plan" on the cabinet's table on July 27, 1967, he had proposed that a Palestinian autonomy be set up in the West Bank. A vast majority of the ministers rejected the plan when it was brought before the plenary session of the government on July 30. However, the attitude toward the plan gradually began changing, to a large extent also because no alternative plans were submitted.
At the beginning of 1968, Allon began formulating another concept. He decided to abandon the Palestinian option and adopt instead what would later be known as the "Jordanian option." The idea raised by Allon was simple: Instead of wrestling with the complex issue of implementing autonomy, the territory would be handed over to Jordan, and in this way Israel would be freed of the need to deal with the Palestinian problem. Allon did not make changes to the map he had sketched in July 1967 (except for adding a passage to join Jordan to the West bank in the area of Jericho), proposing that the Jordan Valley remain in Israeli hands, and that the same should be true for Gush Etzion, part of the Hebron foothills and united Jerusalem. All the remainder would be handed over to King Hussein.
An important discussion about this issue took place at a meeting of the Alignment's diplomatic committee on April 20, 1968. On the agenda was the anticipated meeting of Abba Eban with King Hussein. All those who spoke supported holding the meeting, and most of them - with the exception of Dayan and Shimon Peres who was the secretary of the Rafi party at the time - expressed backing for the "Allon plan" as the basis of the policy.
Toward the end of September 1968, the decisive meeting with Hussein was held. This meeting, which took place in London, was attended both by Eban and Allon. King Hussein was accompanied by his close adviser, Ziad Rifai. Eban outlined for the king the six principles that summed up Israel's approach to a diplomatic agreement with Jordan, which included the demilitarization of the West Bank, the deployment of Israeli troops in the Jordan Valley, a united Jerusalem under Israeli control, and the establishment of a joint authority for the refugees. Allon also showed him the map from his plan, and told Hussein that "these are not temporary corrections that will be valid so long as you are king and as long as I and Abba Eban are alive, but arrangements that will be valid for generations to come - you lost the war and you must face the consequence."
"My problem," Hussein replied, "is how to explain the solution to my nation if it is not a solution that will be acceptable to the Arab awareness."
A few days later, Rifai presented a document with Hussein's six principles, as a response to the six principles outlined by Eban. Hussein wrote inter alia that the Jordanians accept the principles of UN Resolution 242, including the statement that territories cannot be acquired by force. He said that they were aware that changes would have to be made in the cease-fire lines, but that these changes would have to be done on the basis of mutuality. Turning to the question of Jerusalem, he said that the most the Jordanians would be able to agree to would be the recognition of Israel's rights over the places holy to Judaism. The Jordanian document ends by saying that their ability to contribute to the arrangement is totally dependent on their ability to control the internal situation in Jordan, and to explain the agreement to the Arab world. Therefore, the Jordanian document added, any proposal that was discussed would have to be such as the Arab world was prepared to accept, and not something that was forced upon them.
This meeting made it clear to the decision-makers in Israel that the Jordanian option was not feasible. They understood that Hussein did not want to be, and most likely also could not be, the first Arab leader that signed a peace agreement with Israel. Nevertheless, not much time had elapsed until Israel's commitment toward Hussein's regime was put to the test. In September 1970, that "Black September" when Yasser Arafat went to war against Hussein's regime, it was Israel that came to the aid of the king and, in fact, saved his throne.
On March 15, 1972, in an attempt to prevent what seemed to him to be the next step of the Israeli government - the annexation of the West Bank - Hussein proposed that the two sides of the Jordan become united in what would be the "Joint Arab Kingdom" which, of course, he would head. The Palestine Liberation Organization turned down his offer without hesitation. In June 1977, Hussein once again raised the idea of a federation; this time it was to be composed of the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan and an autonomy in the West Bank. This proposal, too, was swiftly rejected by Arafat.
In 1987, Peres, who was then foreign minister, attempted to revive the Jordanian option. After secret talks with Hussein at the London home of their mutual friend, Lord Victor Mishkin, the "London agreement" was drawn up but it was torpedoed by then-prime minister Yitzhak Shamir. Its principles were to a large extent similar to those that had been presented to the king in September 1968. Incidentally, Rifai was also present at this meeting, this time in his capacity as Hussein's prime minister. Then in December 1987 the first intifada broke out, and one of its consequences was Hussein's decision in July 1988 to cut off ties with the West Bank.
The first circle of the Jordanian option, which began in June 1967, was completed on September 13, 1993, with the singing of the Oslo agreements. The government headed by Yitzhak Rabin, who had been the chief of staff in 1967, brought back the Israeli policy with regard to the Palestinian problem to its starting point of June 1967, and to the Palestinian option. In Rabin's decision to recognize the legitimacy of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people, and to sign an agreement with it, came a clear strategic decision between the two basic orientations that had accompanied Israeli policy in the 25 years that preceded the Oslo Accords.
The peace treaty between Israel and Jordan was signed in October 1994. King Hussein, who three decades earlier had been wary of being the first Arab leader to make peace with Israel, followed in the footsteps of Anwar Saadat. On the face of it, the process had been completed and the die had been cast in favor of the Palestinian option, but the second intifada cut short this process, and once again the Jordanian option was pushed into the vacuum that had been created in the peace process beginning in September 2000. The second circle of the Jordanian option had been opened up once again.
Monday, July 23, 2007
Va'et'hanan: Entre projet divin et réalisation terrestre (28 mn)
Yossef Attoun, Rabbin
Centre Meïr d'Etudes Juives (CMEJ) - Jérusalem, Juillet 2007
Monday, July 16, 2007
Wednesday, July 11, 2007
Gad Elmaleh reve de retourner au Centre Hillel
ELIAS LEVY
Reporter
Gad Elmaleh caresse un rêve depuis longtemps: retourner au Centre Hillel francophone de Montréal, sis sur la rue Gatineau, pour présenter un one-man-show.
“C’est un rêve absolu qui trotte sans cesse dans ma tête: retourner sur la petite estrade du Centre Hillel pour faire un petit show. Je parle souvent de ce projet avec mon pot Carl Abitbol. C’est au Hillel que tout a commencé. Je veux ressentir la sensation qui m’électrifiait lors de mes premiers shows. C’est ce qui me permet de garder la tête froide et d’aller de l’avant avec de nouveaux projets de spectacles”, confie le très célèbre humoriste en entrevue depuis un hôtel de Genève, où nous l’avons joint.
C’est au Centre Hillel que Gad Elmaleh rêvait de jouer un jour dans des grandes salles de spectacle.
“Aujourd’hui, il m’arrive de présenter mes spectacles dans une ville devant 10000 ou 12000 personnes. Il faut que je me protège de ça, que mes pieds restent sur terre, que je ne perde pas le sens des perspectives, dit-il. Surtout, je ne dois pas oublier que j’en ai rêvé quand je faisais des Cafés-shows au Centre Hillel devant 200 ou 100 personnes. Ce qui est très étonnant, c’est que quand il n’y avait que 100 spectateurs au Hillel, pour moi on affichait complet. À chaque étape de ma carrière, je me suis dit, sans aucune prétention: “Je suis au top!” C’est une manière de me protéger, de me dire: “Profite de ce qu’il y a maintenant. Les choses pourraient changer demain”. Seuls un bon sens de l’humour et une pointe de dérision nous permettent de garder la tête froide dans ce type de situation. Sinon, tu peux déraper complètement.”
Gad Elmaleh sera bientôt de retour à Montréal pour présenter en première mondiale son nouveau spectacle, Papa est en haut, dans le cadre de l’édition 2007 du Festival Juste pour Rire.
Ce one-man-show sera à l’affiche deux soirées seulement, les 15 et 16 juillet, à 21h30, à la Salle Wilfrid-Pelletier de la Place des Arts.
Dans Papa est en haut, Gad abordera des thèmes très variés ayant comme toile de fond les joies d’avoir un enfant tout en étant une star reconnue. Un spectacle à forts relents autobiographiques qui nous fera rire aux larmes et nous émouvra aussi par moments.
“La plupart de mes spectacles sont en partie autobiographiques. J’ai eu un enfant. Donc, forcément, mes rapports avec les enfants ça fait partie de mon autobiographie. Toujours dans cet esprit de tordre les phrases qu’on dit aux enfants et que ces derniers nous disent. Ce spectacle aborde de front la question de la complexité d’avoir de l’autorité avec un enfant quand on est un humoriste reconnu par le public. Quand on est un humoriste, c’est une chose qui peut être drôle à raconter mais qui peut être aussi parfois un peu triste. Quand ton fils te regarde à la télé faire un sketch et que juste après tu lui dis “Allez, éteint la télé et va dormir”, ça ne va pas ensemble!”
Adaptera-t-il son nouveau spectacle au public québécois en s’exprimant avec l’accent joual du terroir comme lui seul sait le faire?
“Absolument. Je me dois d’adapter le spectacle au Québec, pas uniquement parce que ça fait plaisir au public québécois, mais aussi parce que ça me fait plaisir. À travers des petits clins d’oeil québécois, je me fais plaisir. Ce n’est pas un petit coup de nostalgie, je n’aime pas ce mot, mais des souvenirs, des clins d’oeil sur les expériences que j’ai vécues durant mes années québécoises. Quand le public de Montréal vient me voir, il vient voir non seulement un humoriste, mais aussi un humoriste qui connaît le Québec. Ils savent consciemment, ou inconsciemment, que je suis quelqu’un qui les connaît, qui a vécu la vérité québécoise, pas seulement le cliché de l’accent. Ça, c’est juste rigolo, mais ça ne dure que quelques minutes.”
Réserve-t-il aussi quelques surprises au public sépharade montréalais?
“Oui, il y aura dans ce spectacle des choses qui concernent les Sépharades. Dans mon spectacle précédent, L’Autre c’est moi, j’avais amorcé une “réflexion” sur l’avenir de l’identité sépharade -il pouffe de rire- en présentant une espèce de portrait d’un mariage mixte entre un Juif sépharade et une Québécoise. J’ai expliqué par des expériences vécues au quotidien que l’impossibilité de cette relation ne venait pas de la religion mais des différences culturelles énormes qui séparaient ces deux êtres pleins de tendresse et de bonne volonté. Toute cette “réflexion” bien sûr regorgeait d’humour et tournait à la dérision. Il y aura un brin de ça dans Papa est en haut. J’aime bien provoquer et titiller les Québécoises. Je ne sais pas pourquoi, mais j’aime ça!”
Se considère-t-il comme un humoriste juif sépharade marocain?
“Je n’aime pas me définir comme ça. Je pense toujours au gars qui ne me connaît pas, je ne pense jamais au gars qui me connaît. Quand on me demande de me définir, je pense toujours à ceux et celles qui n’ont jamais entendu parler de moi. Il est indéniable que mon identité juive, sépharade et marocaine occupe une place importante dans ma vie et nourrit mon regard sur le monde. Si je n’étais pas Juif, si je n’étais pas né au Maroc, je ne regarderais pas le monde de cette manière. Si je n’avais pas reçu une éducation juive, si je n’avais pas eu un rapport avec le spirituel et l’irrationalité, je crois que jamais je n’aurais eu le regard que je porte aujourd’hui sur le monde, la vie, les personnes, les choses…”
Les valeurs inhérentes à l’éducation juive qu’il a reçue au Maroc quand il était enfant l’aident à affronter plus sereinement les aléas du succès artistique.
“Sans cette éducation juive, il est fort probable que j’aurais déjà pété un plomb! Je n’ai pas reçu une éducation religieuse, mais une éducation qui m’a transmis des valeurs et des enseignements cardinaux sur: le sens du respect et du Kavod, l’orgueil, la modestie, la charité, le respect d’autrui, le rapport au sacré… Après, on peut adapter comme on veut ces valeurs et enseignements aux situations auxquelles on fait face dans la vie. Quand tu as de la notoriété, cet enseignement et ces valeurs t’aident beaucoup. Quand tu vas à la synagogue et tu fais la prière, ça t’aide parce que tu as été confronté à des choses qui peuvent paraître irrationnelles, totalement folles, mais que tu dois respecter. Mon éducation juive m’a aidé à me protéger face à la notoriété, qui est une réalité très abstraite, et à respecter mes rêves.”
Pour un artiste, les rêves d’enfance sont le carburant qui le motive à persévérer pour atteindre des sommets plus hauts, croit cette méga star de l’humour francophone.
“Quand tu rêves d’une chose, il ne faut pas oublier quand elle se réalise que tu l’as un jour rêvée. Tu ne peux pas faire le malin avec la vie. Hier soir, à Genève, l’acteur Jean Reno est venu de Paris pour voir mon spectacle. Jean Reno est né aussi à Casablanca, il est parti à 17 ans, il a eu comme moi une enfance marocaine. Il a réussi aux États-Unis -il est un des rares acteurs français à avoir accompli cette prouesse. On a beaucoup de points communs. Ce qui est bizarre, c’est que quand on est môme, on a des gens qu’on admire. Ce sont nos moteurs, nos modèles. Le jour où on rentre dans ce métier, on les rencontre. On fait alors comme si c’était normal, on oublie nos premières fascinations. Jean Reno a été pour moi un de mes moteurs. Je lui ai rappelé hier soir devant le public genevoix. Il faut respecter et ne jamais oublier les rêves qu’on a eus quand on était enfant.”
En plus de sa carrière sur les planches, Gad Elmaleh a participé ces dernières années à de nombreux projets cinématographiques. Le public québécois pourra bientôt le voir dans le film Hors de prix aux côtés d’Audrey Tautou (l’héroïne du Fabuleux destin d’Amélie Poulain et de Da Vinci Code). Une comédie romantique de Pierre Salvadori qui a connu en France un grand succès: plus de 2 millions d’entrées.
Il s’attelle actuellement à l’écriture du scénario d’un film dont il sera le metteur en scène. L’héros de cette aventure loufoque sera l’un des personnages fétiches de ses spectacles, Coco, un Juif sépharade mégalomane qui veut organiser pour son fils une Bar Mitzvah grandiose, qui fera date dans les annales du judaïsme…
“Ce sera un film dans la lignée de La vérité si je mens, qui sera produit par un grand producteur français, Alain Goldman, qui vient de produire La Môme, le film sur la vie d’Edith Piaf. Pour l’instant, le seul qui a accepté de tourner dans ce film c’est moi. Je ne suis pas sûr que je vais me faire passer un casting pour le rôle!”
Gad Elmaleh semble être beaucoup plus emballé par les spectacles sur scène que par le cinéma.
“Je ne vous cacherai pas que je suis beaucoup plus heureux sur scène qu’au cinéma. Le one-man show m’apporte tellement de joie et d’intensité sur scène. Au cinéma, je veux faire des choses intéressantes, des projets qui m’excitent, comme écrire des scénarios de films.”
Reporter
Gad Elmaleh caresse un rêve depuis longtemps: retourner au Centre Hillel francophone de Montréal, sis sur la rue Gatineau, pour présenter un one-man-show.
“C’est un rêve absolu qui trotte sans cesse dans ma tête: retourner sur la petite estrade du Centre Hillel pour faire un petit show. Je parle souvent de ce projet avec mon pot Carl Abitbol. C’est au Hillel que tout a commencé. Je veux ressentir la sensation qui m’électrifiait lors de mes premiers shows. C’est ce qui me permet de garder la tête froide et d’aller de l’avant avec de nouveaux projets de spectacles”, confie le très célèbre humoriste en entrevue depuis un hôtel de Genève, où nous l’avons joint.
C’est au Centre Hillel que Gad Elmaleh rêvait de jouer un jour dans des grandes salles de spectacle.
“Aujourd’hui, il m’arrive de présenter mes spectacles dans une ville devant 10000 ou 12000 personnes. Il faut que je me protège de ça, que mes pieds restent sur terre, que je ne perde pas le sens des perspectives, dit-il. Surtout, je ne dois pas oublier que j’en ai rêvé quand je faisais des Cafés-shows au Centre Hillel devant 200 ou 100 personnes. Ce qui est très étonnant, c’est que quand il n’y avait que 100 spectateurs au Hillel, pour moi on affichait complet. À chaque étape de ma carrière, je me suis dit, sans aucune prétention: “Je suis au top!” C’est une manière de me protéger, de me dire: “Profite de ce qu’il y a maintenant. Les choses pourraient changer demain”. Seuls un bon sens de l’humour et une pointe de dérision nous permettent de garder la tête froide dans ce type de situation. Sinon, tu peux déraper complètement.”
Gad Elmaleh sera bientôt de retour à Montréal pour présenter en première mondiale son nouveau spectacle, Papa est en haut, dans le cadre de l’édition 2007 du Festival Juste pour Rire.
Ce one-man-show sera à l’affiche deux soirées seulement, les 15 et 16 juillet, à 21h30, à la Salle Wilfrid-Pelletier de la Place des Arts.
Dans Papa est en haut, Gad abordera des thèmes très variés ayant comme toile de fond les joies d’avoir un enfant tout en étant une star reconnue. Un spectacle à forts relents autobiographiques qui nous fera rire aux larmes et nous émouvra aussi par moments.
“La plupart de mes spectacles sont en partie autobiographiques. J’ai eu un enfant. Donc, forcément, mes rapports avec les enfants ça fait partie de mon autobiographie. Toujours dans cet esprit de tordre les phrases qu’on dit aux enfants et que ces derniers nous disent. Ce spectacle aborde de front la question de la complexité d’avoir de l’autorité avec un enfant quand on est un humoriste reconnu par le public. Quand on est un humoriste, c’est une chose qui peut être drôle à raconter mais qui peut être aussi parfois un peu triste. Quand ton fils te regarde à la télé faire un sketch et que juste après tu lui dis “Allez, éteint la télé et va dormir”, ça ne va pas ensemble!”
Adaptera-t-il son nouveau spectacle au public québécois en s’exprimant avec l’accent joual du terroir comme lui seul sait le faire?
“Absolument. Je me dois d’adapter le spectacle au Québec, pas uniquement parce que ça fait plaisir au public québécois, mais aussi parce que ça me fait plaisir. À travers des petits clins d’oeil québécois, je me fais plaisir. Ce n’est pas un petit coup de nostalgie, je n’aime pas ce mot, mais des souvenirs, des clins d’oeil sur les expériences que j’ai vécues durant mes années québécoises. Quand le public de Montréal vient me voir, il vient voir non seulement un humoriste, mais aussi un humoriste qui connaît le Québec. Ils savent consciemment, ou inconsciemment, que je suis quelqu’un qui les connaît, qui a vécu la vérité québécoise, pas seulement le cliché de l’accent. Ça, c’est juste rigolo, mais ça ne dure que quelques minutes.”
Réserve-t-il aussi quelques surprises au public sépharade montréalais?
“Oui, il y aura dans ce spectacle des choses qui concernent les Sépharades. Dans mon spectacle précédent, L’Autre c’est moi, j’avais amorcé une “réflexion” sur l’avenir de l’identité sépharade -il pouffe de rire- en présentant une espèce de portrait d’un mariage mixte entre un Juif sépharade et une Québécoise. J’ai expliqué par des expériences vécues au quotidien que l’impossibilité de cette relation ne venait pas de la religion mais des différences culturelles énormes qui séparaient ces deux êtres pleins de tendresse et de bonne volonté. Toute cette “réflexion” bien sûr regorgeait d’humour et tournait à la dérision. Il y aura un brin de ça dans Papa est en haut. J’aime bien provoquer et titiller les Québécoises. Je ne sais pas pourquoi, mais j’aime ça!”
Se considère-t-il comme un humoriste juif sépharade marocain?
“Je n’aime pas me définir comme ça. Je pense toujours au gars qui ne me connaît pas, je ne pense jamais au gars qui me connaît. Quand on me demande de me définir, je pense toujours à ceux et celles qui n’ont jamais entendu parler de moi. Il est indéniable que mon identité juive, sépharade et marocaine occupe une place importante dans ma vie et nourrit mon regard sur le monde. Si je n’étais pas Juif, si je n’étais pas né au Maroc, je ne regarderais pas le monde de cette manière. Si je n’avais pas reçu une éducation juive, si je n’avais pas eu un rapport avec le spirituel et l’irrationalité, je crois que jamais je n’aurais eu le regard que je porte aujourd’hui sur le monde, la vie, les personnes, les choses…”
Les valeurs inhérentes à l’éducation juive qu’il a reçue au Maroc quand il était enfant l’aident à affronter plus sereinement les aléas du succès artistique.
“Sans cette éducation juive, il est fort probable que j’aurais déjà pété un plomb! Je n’ai pas reçu une éducation religieuse, mais une éducation qui m’a transmis des valeurs et des enseignements cardinaux sur: le sens du respect et du Kavod, l’orgueil, la modestie, la charité, le respect d’autrui, le rapport au sacré… Après, on peut adapter comme on veut ces valeurs et enseignements aux situations auxquelles on fait face dans la vie. Quand tu as de la notoriété, cet enseignement et ces valeurs t’aident beaucoup. Quand tu vas à la synagogue et tu fais la prière, ça t’aide parce que tu as été confronté à des choses qui peuvent paraître irrationnelles, totalement folles, mais que tu dois respecter. Mon éducation juive m’a aidé à me protéger face à la notoriété, qui est une réalité très abstraite, et à respecter mes rêves.”
Pour un artiste, les rêves d’enfance sont le carburant qui le motive à persévérer pour atteindre des sommets plus hauts, croit cette méga star de l’humour francophone.
“Quand tu rêves d’une chose, il ne faut pas oublier quand elle se réalise que tu l’as un jour rêvée. Tu ne peux pas faire le malin avec la vie. Hier soir, à Genève, l’acteur Jean Reno est venu de Paris pour voir mon spectacle. Jean Reno est né aussi à Casablanca, il est parti à 17 ans, il a eu comme moi une enfance marocaine. Il a réussi aux États-Unis -il est un des rares acteurs français à avoir accompli cette prouesse. On a beaucoup de points communs. Ce qui est bizarre, c’est que quand on est môme, on a des gens qu’on admire. Ce sont nos moteurs, nos modèles. Le jour où on rentre dans ce métier, on les rencontre. On fait alors comme si c’était normal, on oublie nos premières fascinations. Jean Reno a été pour moi un de mes moteurs. Je lui ai rappelé hier soir devant le public genevoix. Il faut respecter et ne jamais oublier les rêves qu’on a eus quand on était enfant.”
En plus de sa carrière sur les planches, Gad Elmaleh a participé ces dernières années à de nombreux projets cinématographiques. Le public québécois pourra bientôt le voir dans le film Hors de prix aux côtés d’Audrey Tautou (l’héroïne du Fabuleux destin d’Amélie Poulain et de Da Vinci Code). Une comédie romantique de Pierre Salvadori qui a connu en France un grand succès: plus de 2 millions d’entrées.
Il s’attelle actuellement à l’écriture du scénario d’un film dont il sera le metteur en scène. L’héros de cette aventure loufoque sera l’un des personnages fétiches de ses spectacles, Coco, un Juif sépharade mégalomane qui veut organiser pour son fils une Bar Mitzvah grandiose, qui fera date dans les annales du judaïsme…
“Ce sera un film dans la lignée de La vérité si je mens, qui sera produit par un grand producteur français, Alain Goldman, qui vient de produire La Môme, le film sur la vie d’Edith Piaf. Pour l’instant, le seul qui a accepté de tourner dans ce film c’est moi. Je ne suis pas sûr que je vais me faire passer un casting pour le rôle!”
Gad Elmaleh semble être beaucoup plus emballé par les spectacles sur scène que par le cinéma.
“Je ne vous cacherai pas que je suis beaucoup plus heureux sur scène qu’au cinéma. Le one-man show m’apporte tellement de joie et d’intensité sur scène. Au cinéma, je veux faire des choses intéressantes, des projets qui m’excitent, comme écrire des scénarios de films.”
Tuesday, July 10, 2007
Thursday, July 5, 2007
Danielle Laberge, rectrice par intérim de l'UQAM, désapprouve la proposition de boycott des universités israéliennes du University and College Union
Le 26 juin 2007 –
La rectrice par intérim de l'UQAM, madame Danielle Laberge, ayant pris connaissance avec consternation de la proposition de boycott des universités israéliennes mise de l'avant par la University and College Union (UCU) du Royaume-Uni, désapprouve formellement une telle proposition. « Comme plusieurs autres universités qui ont déjà réagi à la situation à travers le monde, nous désapprouvons le geste de nos collègues du Royaume-Uni et les incitons à revoir sans délai une position qui fait honte à l'institution universitaire », de déclarer madame Laberge.
« Bien que l'Université soit soumise à des pressions de plus en plus fortes dans le contexte d'une mondialisation croissante, et bien que le débat démocratique revendiqué par la University and College Union y ait toujours sa place, le choix de boycotter l'ensemble des institutions universitaires d'un pays va clairement à l'encontre de l'idée même d'université », de poursuivre la rectrice par intérim.
« Depuis ses origines, la force de l'institution universitaire et ce qui la caractérise parmi toutes les institutions, c'est la place primordiale qu'elle accorde au développement des connaissances, à leur partage et à l'engagement de débats intellectuels ouverts, cherchant
sans cesse à se dégager des idéologies, des idées reçues et des considérations de nature religieuse, ethnique ou politique. C'est dans ces conditions que doivent s'exercer l'autonomie universitaire et l'esprit critique », conclut madame Laberge.
La rectrice par intérim de l'UQAM, madame Danielle Laberge, ayant pris connaissance avec consternation de la proposition de boycott des universités israéliennes mise de l'avant par la University and College Union (UCU) du Royaume-Uni, désapprouve formellement une telle proposition. « Comme plusieurs autres universités qui ont déjà réagi à la situation à travers le monde, nous désapprouvons le geste de nos collègues du Royaume-Uni et les incitons à revoir sans délai une position qui fait honte à l'institution universitaire », de déclarer madame Laberge.
« Bien que l'Université soit soumise à des pressions de plus en plus fortes dans le contexte d'une mondialisation croissante, et bien que le débat démocratique revendiqué par la University and College Union y ait toujours sa place, le choix de boycotter l'ensemble des institutions universitaires d'un pays va clairement à l'encontre de l'idée même d'université », de poursuivre la rectrice par intérim.
« Depuis ses origines, la force de l'institution universitaire et ce qui la caractérise parmi toutes les institutions, c'est la place primordiale qu'elle accorde au développement des connaissances, à leur partage et à l'engagement de débats intellectuels ouverts, cherchant
sans cesse à se dégager des idéologies, des idées reçues et des considérations de nature religieuse, ethnique ou politique. C'est dans ces conditions que doivent s'exercer l'autonomie universitaire et l'esprit critique », conclut madame Laberge.
Le recteur de l'Université de Montréal dénonce le boycott des universités israéliennes
Montréal, le 22 juin 2007 –
Le recteur de l'Université de Montréal, Luc Vinet, a joint sa voix à celle des leaders des grandes universités canadiennes et américaines qui dénoncent le boycott des universités israéliennes auquel le Syndicat des universités et collèges universitaires britannique (University and College Union) a invité ses membres. « Un tel boycott, qui propose la rupture du dialogue entre intellectuels, représente, dans son essence même, la négation des valeurs universitaires les plus fondamentales que sont la liberté d'expression et la valorisation de la circulation des idées. Quelles que soient les opinions des uns et des autres sur le conflit au Moyen-Orient, la résolution de l'affrontement ne saurait venir que de la poursuite du dialogue et non de gestes de fermeture comme celui qui est suggéré par le University and College Union ». Rappelons que le 30 mai dernier, le Syndicat des universités et collèges universitaires (UCU) britannique a adopté une résolution appelant ses membres « au boycott total et constant » de toutes les institutions universitaires israéliennes.
Le recteur de l'Université de Montréal, Luc Vinet, a joint sa voix à celle des leaders des grandes universités canadiennes et américaines qui dénoncent le boycott des universités israéliennes auquel le Syndicat des universités et collèges universitaires britannique (University and College Union) a invité ses membres. « Un tel boycott, qui propose la rupture du dialogue entre intellectuels, représente, dans son essence même, la négation des valeurs universitaires les plus fondamentales que sont la liberté d'expression et la valorisation de la circulation des idées. Quelles que soient les opinions des uns et des autres sur le conflit au Moyen-Orient, la résolution de l'affrontement ne saurait venir que de la poursuite du dialogue et non de gestes de fermeture comme celui qui est suggéré par le University and College Union ». Rappelons que le 30 mai dernier, le Syndicat des universités et collèges universitaires (UCU) britannique a adopté une résolution appelant ses membres « au boycott total et constant » de toutes les institutions universitaires israéliennes.
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